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VOTING, THE SYMMETRIC GROUP, AND REPRESENTATION THEORY
ZAJJ DAUGHERTY, ALEXANDER K. EUSTIS, GREGORY MINTON, AND MICHAEL E. ORRISON
Abstract. We show how voting may be viewed naturally from an algebraic perspective by viewing voting
profiles as elements of certain well-studied QSn-modules. By using only a handful of simple combinatorial
objects (e.g., tabloids) and some basic ideas from representation theory (e.g., Schur’s Lemma), this allows
us to recast and extend some well-known results in the field of voting theory.
1. Introduction
For more than 25 years, Donald Saari has been systematically developing a powerful geometric approach
to understanding, explaining, and constructing paradoxes that occur in voting [7]-[18]. One of the keys to
Saari’s geometric approach is the fact that the collection of votes from an election can often be encoded
naturally as a vector, which we call a profile, and that election procedures can often be viewed as, or are
related to, linear transformations.
By focusing on specific geometric structures in this vector space setting, Saari has been able to sidestep
many of the prohibitively difficult combinatorial obstructions that are often associated with voting analysis.
In doing so, he draws our attention to the specialized roles played by a handful of specific subspaces of the
vector space of profiles. This geometric approach has led to an impressive number of unexpected results in
voting theory, as well as a refined understanding of many fundamental and important results in the field (see
[14] and [15] for engaging overviews of the subject).
Ever since we began thinking about the mathematics of voting, we have been intrigued by the prominent
role played by symmetry arguments in Saari’s work (see [9], [11], and [14] for gentle introductions to such
arguments). In particular, it seemed to us that many of the symmetry-based ideas we were encountering
could be explained easily if we only had the right algebraic framework. In this paper, we describe just such
a framework. More specifically, we show how voting may be viewed naturally from an algebraic perspective
by viewing profiles as elements of certain well-studied QSn-modules.
By using only a handful of simple combinatorial objects (e.g., tabloids) and some basic ideas from represen-
tation theory (e.g., Schur’s Lemma), we are able to recast and extend some of Saari’s well-known results. For
example, we recover a result concerning the important relationship between the Borda count and pairwise
voting when voters return full rankings of the candidates (Theorem 6). We then extend this result to a
situation in which voters return partial rankings of the candidates (Theorem 9). In the process, we construct
an infinite family of “Borda-like” voting procedures. With the help of our main theorem (Theorem 1), we
also, for example, address the relationship between positional voting and approval voting (Theorem 2).
Our experience to date has convinced us that approaching the study of voting from an algebraic perspective
can be incredibly illuminating when it comes to understanding the mathematical underpinnings of many
different voting procedures. In fact, we see this paper as a first step toward what might eventually be called
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algebraic voting theory. Although the ideas presented here are just the tip of the iceberg, we believe they
will be of great interest to voting theorists and enthusiasts alike.
2. Voting on Tabloids
We begin by introducing combinatorial objects called tabloids. These objects play an important role in the
representation theory of the symmetric group (see, for example, [19]). Tabloids also appear in the analysis
of partially ranked data, which includes the type of voting data we will be considering throughout this paper
(see [4] and [6]).
Let n be a positive integer. A composition of n is a sequence λ = (λ1, . . . , λm) of positive integers whose
sum is n. If λ1 ≥ · · · ≥ λm, then λ is a partition of n. For example, λ = (2, 1, 1, 3) is a composition of 7, but
not a partition of 7, and (4, 2, 1, 1) is a partition (and therefore also a composition) of 8.
The Ferrers diagram of shape λ is the left-justified array of dots with λi dots in the ith row (see Figure 1).
If the dots of a Ferrers diagram of shape λ are replaced by boxes containing the numbers 1, . . . , n without
repetition, then we create a Young tableau of shape λ. Two Young tableaux are said to be row equivalent
if they differ only by a permutation of the entries within the rows of each tableau. An equivalence class of
tableaux under this relation is called a tabloid of shape λ.
• •
• • •
•
• • •
Figure 1. The Ferrers diagram of shape (2, 3, 1, 3).
We will denote a tabloid by first forming a representative tableau and then removing the vertical dividers
within each row (see Figure 2). For convenience, we will usually choose the representative tableau whose
entries in each row are in ascending order.
4 9
5 2 3
7
8 1 6
9 4
2 5 3
7
6 8 1
4 9
2 3 5
7
1 6 8
Figure 2. Two equivalent tableaux and their tabloid.
Let Xλ denote the set of tabloids of shape λ. Tabloids can be used to index voting data. For example,
suppose there are n candidates, c1, . . . , cn, in an election. If the voters have been asked to vote by returning
a list of the candidates in order of preference, from most to least favored, then each voter is essentially being
asked to choose a tabloid from the set X(1,...,1). For example, if there are n = 3 candidates, then each voter
must return one of the following tabloids from X(1,1,1):
1
2
3
,
1
3
2
,
2
1
3
,
2
3
1
,
3
1
2
,
3
2
1
.
In this case, a voter who returns the second tabloid above prefers c1 to c3 to c2, whereas a voter who returns
the last tabloid prefers c3 to c2 to c1.
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On the other hand, suppose the voters are asked to simply vote for their favorite candidate. We could
certainly obtain this information from the choices they made from X(1,...,1) by focusing only on top-ranked
candidates. It may be much easier (for us and them), however, to have them choose from the set X(1,n−1).
For example, if n = 4, then we would be asking our voters to choose one of the following tabloids from X(1,3):
1
2 3 4
,
2
1 3 4
,
3
1 2 4
,
4
1 2 3
.
In this case, by choosing the third tabloid above, a voter is saying that her favorite candidate is c3 (and that
she is indifferent, as far as her vote is concerned, to candidates c1, c2, and c4).
When voters are asked to provide their rankings of the candidates by choosing a tabloid from X(1,...,1),
we say that they are giving full rankings of the candidates; if they are choosing tabloids from Xλ where
λ 6= (1, . . . , 1), then we say that they are giving partial rankings of the candidates.
To determine the winner of an election based on choosing tabloids from Xλ, we need to know the number
of votes received by each x ∈ Xλ. With that in mind, let p : Xλ → N be the function such that p(x) is the
number of voters that voted for the tabloid x. The function p is called a profile.
In fact, we will call every function p : Xλ → Q a profile. We do this primarily because, unlike functions
from Xλ to N, the set Mλ = {p : Xλ → Q} forms a vector space (over Q) where, for all p,q ∈ Mλ and all
α ∈ Q, (p + q)(x) = p(x) + q(x) and (αp)(x) = αp(x). Note that the dimension of Mλ is |Xλ|, and that
the indicator functions form a basis for Mλ (where the indicator function for x ∈ Xλ is the function that is
1 on x and 0 on every other tabloid in Xλ).
When it is convenient, we will also view a profile p ∈ Mλ as a formal linear combination of the tabloids in
Xλ, where the coefficient in front of the tabloid x is p(x). For example, if n = 3 and there are eleven voters,
then our profile (which is an example used in Chp. 2 of [14]) might look like
3
1
2
3
+ 2
1
3
2
+ 0
2
1
3
+ 2
2
3
1
+ 0
3
1
2
+ 4
3
2
1
where three voters chose the first list, two voters chose the second list, zero voters chose the third list, and
so on.
Although viewing profiles as formal linear combinations of tabloids can be useful at times, we will typically
view profiles as column vectors in Q|X
λ|. We do this by choosing the indicator functions of Mλ as a basis,
which we order based on the lexicographic ordering of the tabloids. For example, we would encode the above
profile as the vector
p =


3
2
0
2
0
4


123
132
213
231
312
321
where we have placed labels corresponding to the rankings to the right of the vector so that the correspon-
dence can be seen more easily.
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3. Positional Voting Procedures
Now that we know what profiles look like, we can turn our attention to voting procedures. In this paper, we
will primarily focus our attention on voting procedures that assign points to each candidate based on their
position in a voter’s choice of a tabloid.
Let λ = (λ1, . . . , λm) be a composition of n, let w = [w1, . . . , wm]
t be a vector in Qm, and suppose we are
given a profile p ∈ Mλ. We use the vector w, which is called a weighting vector, to assign points to each
candidate, and the candidate who receives the most points is declared to be the winner. We do this as
follows. For each tabloid x, if candidate ci is in row j of x, then she will be given wjp(x) points. Summing
over all tabloids x ∈ Xλ then determines the total number of points assigned to candidate ci. We will refer
to this as a positional voting procedure of type λ based on w.
For example, consider our three-candidate and eleven-voter example above. If we use a positional voting
procedure with weighting vector w = [1, s, 0]t, where 0 ≤ s ≤ 1, then candidate c1 will receive (3× 1)+ (0×
s) + (6 × 0) = 5 points, candidate c2 will receive (2 × 1) + (7 × s) + (2 × 0) = 2 + 7s points, and candidate
c3 will receive (4 × 1) + (4 × s) + (3 × 0) = 4 + 4s points. We encode these points in the results vector
r = [5, 2 + 7s, 4 + 4s]t.
The point, of course, of using the parameter s in this example is that it highlights one of the things that
makes voting theory so interesting: for a fixed profile p, the outcomes of an election can vary wildly with
the choice of an election procedure. In fact, as Saari points out in [14],
“...rather than reflecting the views of the voters, it is entirely possible for an election outcome
to more accurately reflect the choice of an election procedure.”
To see this, note that in the above example, when s = 0, we have the well-known plurality voting procedure
(“vote for your favorite”), in which case c1 wins with a results vector of r = [5, 2, 4]
t. When s = 1 (“vote for
everyone but your least favorite”), c2 wins with a results vector of r = [5, 9, 8]
t, and when s = 1/2, c3 wins
with a results vector of r = [5, 5 12 , 6]
t. (See Chp. 2 of [14] for this and other voting paradoxes.)
One attractive feature of positional voting is that the results vectors they produce can be realized as the
product of a matrix, which we will denote by Tw, and the profile in question. For example, if p and
w = [1, s, 0]t are as above, then
Tw(p) =

1 1 s 0 s 0s 0 1 1 0 s
0 s 0 s 1 1




3
2
0
2
0
4


=

 52 + 7s
4 + 4s

 = r.
In fact, and this is a simple but key insight, every positional voting method of type λ based on the weighting
vector w can be viewed as a linear transformation Tw : M
λ → M (1,n−1) since we may use the tabloids in
X(1,n−1) to index the set of candidates. For example, we have T[1,s,0]t : M
(1,1,1) → M (1,2) in the example
above.
Recognizing that Tw : M
λ → M (1,n−1) is a linear transformation is certainly useful, but there are other,
hidden algebraic structures within the framework we have just constructed. To begin to see some of these
structures, let λ = (λ1, . . . , λm) be a composition of n. There are n! tableaux of shape λ. In fact, we may
think of a tableau as a full ranking of the candidates by reading, left to right, top to bottom, the entries of
the tableau. For example, the tableau
4
2 5
1 3
4
would correspond to the full ranking
2
5
1
3
4
.
This is useful, because we may then view a vote for the tabloid
2 5
1 3
4
as coming from anyone whose full ranking of the candidates corresponds to one of the tableaux in the
equivalence class of the tabloid. For example, the above tabloid could correspond to any of the following full
rankings:
2
5
1
3
4
,
2
5
3
1
4
,
5
2
1
3
4
,
5
2
3
1
4
.
This simple insight allows us to view profiles p ∈ Mλ as elements of M (1,...,1) in the following manner. Let
f be the number of full rankings corresponding to a tabloid of shape λ. Define ι : Mλ → M (1,...,1) (think
“inclusion”) by mapping each tabloid (i.e., each indicator function) to the sum of its corresponding full
rankings times 1/f . For example, the tabloid of shape λ = (2, 2, 1) above would be mapped to
1
4


2
5
1
3
4
+
2
5
3
1
4
+
5
2
1
3
4
+
5
2
3
1
4

 .
If we define pi :M (1,...,1) →Mλ (think “projection”) by mapping each full ranking to the tabloid of shape λ
that contains it, then note that pi ◦ ι :Mλ →Mλ is the identity transformation.
Let p ∈Mλ, and define p = ι(p). In other words, each profile p ∈Mλ maybe viewed as a profile p ∈M (1,...,1)
that is constant on the equivalence classes that form the tabloids of shape λ. Moreover, if w = [w1, . . . , wm]
t
is a weighting vector associated to λ, and we define w to be the weighting vector in Qn whose first λ1 entries
are equal to w1, whose next λ2 entries are equal to w2, and so on, then
Tw(p) = Tw(p).
For example, suppose λ = (2, 1), w = [3, 0]t, and
5
p = 5
1 2
3
+ 4
1 3
2
+ 7
2 3
1
.
Then w = [3, 3, 0]t,
p =
5
2

 12
3
+
2
1
3

+ 2

 13
2
+
3
1
2

+ 7
2

 23
1
+
3
2
1

 ,
and
Tw(p) =

3 3 03 0 3
0 3 3



54
7

 =

3 3 3 0 3 03 0 3 3 0 3
0 3 0 3 3 3




5
2
2
5
2
7
2
2
7
2


= Tw(p).
4. Representation Theory and the Symmetric Group
We have just seen that profiles can be viewed as vectors, and that each positional voting procedure can be
viewed as a linear transformation. In this section, we describe the role that the symmetric group plays in
positional voting. In particular, as we illustrate below, each map Tw : M
λ → M (1,n−1) is more than just a
linear transformation—it is a QSn-module homomorphism.
To explain, let λ be a composition of n. The symmetric group Sn acts naturally on the set X
λ of tabloids
of shape λ by permuting the entries of the tabloids. For example, if n = 5 and σ = (1 3)(2 5 4), then
σ
2 3 5
1 4
=
σ(2) σ(3) σ(5)
σ(1) σ(4)
=
5 1 4
3 2
.
We may extend the action of Sn on X
λ to an action of Sn on the profile space M
λ by defining (σp)(x) =
p(σ−1x). Moreover, we may extend this action to an action of the group ring QSn on M
λ where if a =∑
σ∈Sn
aσσ, then (ap)(x) =
∑
σ∈Sn
aσp(σ
−1x).
The action of QSn on M
λ turns Mλ into something called a QSn-module. We will not discuss modules in
general in this paper (see, for example, [5] for a nice introduction to modules). We will, however, describe
some of the more useful implications of this realization as far as voting is concerned.
To begin, note that, for each element a ∈ QSn, there is a linear transformation La : M
λ → Mλ defined by
setting La(p) = ap. If we let End(M
λ) denote the ring of linear transformations from Mλ to itself (the ring
of endomorphisms), then this defines a ring homomorphism ρ : QSn → End(M
λ).
The homomorphism ρ is an example of a representation of QSn since each element a ∈ QSn may be
“represented” by a linear transformation ρ(a) = La ∈ End(M
λ). Furthermore, if we restrict ρ to the
elements of Sn, then the images are all invertible linear transformations. In other words, we have a group
homomorphism ρ ↓Sn : Sn → Aut(M
λ) = GL(Mλ), which is a representation of Sn.
The fact that Mλ is a QSn-module tells us that we can write M
λ as a direct sum of QSn-submodules, which
are subspaces that are invariant under the action of QSn (and are therefore QSn-modules themselves). In
other words, there are decompositions
Mλ =M1 ⊕ · · · ⊕Mk
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such that, for all a ∈ QSn and pi ∈Mi, api ∈Mi.
A submodule U of a module M is said to be simple if U 6= 0, and the only submodules of U are 0 and U
itself. It turns out that, up to isomorphism, there are only a finite number of distinct simple QSn-modules.
Furthermore, these simple modules can be (and typically are) indexed by the partitions of n. In this paper,
we use a well-known indexing scheme (see [19]), and we denote the simple QSn-module indexed by the
partition µ of n by Sµ.
As an example, it turns out that M (1,2) ∼= S(3) ⊕ S(2,1) and M (1,1,1) ∼= S(3) ⊕ S(2,1) ⊕ S(2,1) ⊕ S(1,1,1). To
make these decompositions more concrete, consider the following decomposition of M (1,2):
M (1,2) = 〈

11
1

〉 ⊕ 〈

 1−1
0

 ,

 10
−1

〉.
Both of the subspaces on the right are invariant under the action of QS3. The first space, the span of the
“all-ones” vector, is obviously invariant under the action of QS3. After all, the entries in these vectors are
all equal, and permuting the entries of such vectors does not change this fact.
The second subspace, which is the orthogonal complement (with respect to the usual dot product) of the
first subspace, is the subspace of vectors whose entries sum to zero. Since this property too is preserved
under the action of QS3, it too is a submodule of M
(1,2).
Both of these subspaces are simple QS3-modules. The first space is isomorphic to S
(3), and in general, we
use S(n) to denote this “trivial”, one-dimensional QSn-module that has the property that every element
of Sn acts as the identity linear transformation. The second space is isomorphic to S
(2,1), and in general,
S(n−1,1) is the (n − 1)-dimensional simple module that is isomorphic to the orthogonal complement of the
span of the all-ones vector in the n-dimensional QSn-module M
(1,n−1) ∼=M (n−1,1).
To see how all of this is related to voting, let λ = (λ1, . . . , λm) be a composition of n, let w = [w1, . . . , wm]
t
be a weighting vector, and consider the positional voting procedure Tw :M
λ →M (1,n−1) of shape λ based on
w. First, note that the linear transformation Tw is actually a QSn-module homomorphism. In other words,
if a ∈ QSn, then Tw(ap) = aTw(p). After all, if σ ∈ Sn, then we are simply asking that Tw(σp) = σTw(p),
which is the same as saying that, “if we permute the labels on the candidates, then we need only permute
the original scores in the same way.” We are just extending this notion, which is called neutrality (see, for
example, [18]), to the action of the entire group ring.
Viewing Tw as a QSn-module homomorphism is helpful for a couple of reasons. First, if T : M → N is a
module homomorphism, then the kernel of T is a submodule of M , and the image of T is a submodule of
N . In fact, if we define the effective space E(T ) of T to be the orthogonal complement (with respect to the
usual dot product) of the kernel of T , then E(T ) ∼= T (M) as modules. Therefore, knowing something about
E(Tw) might help us say something about Tw.
Second, once we know we are dealing with module homomorphisms, we can look to an elementary but
immensely useful theorem for insight:
Schur’s Lemma. Any nonzero module homomorphism between simple modules is an iso-
morphism.
How can we make use of Schur’s Lemma in our study of voting? Consider our positional voting procedure
Tw :M
λ →M (1,n−1). As we noted above, the module M (1,n−1) is isomorphic to a direct sum of the simple
7
modules S(n) and S(n−1,1). This means that any simple submodule U of Mλ that is not isomorphic to S(n)
or S(n−1,1) must be in the kernel of Tw, i.e., such a submodule only contains information that will have
absolutely no effect on the results of the election.
For example, if n = 3 and we have Tw :M
(1,1,1) →M (1,2), then since M (1,2) ∼= S(3) ⊕ S(2,1) and M (1,1,1) ∼=
S(3) ⊕ S(2,1) ⊕ S(2,1) ⊕ S(1,1,1), we know that the kernel of Tw must contain exactly one copy of S
(1,1,1) and
at least one copy of S(2,1). We will say more about this below. Before we do, however, we need one more
idea. Although it may appear simple on the surface, it will play a major role in what follows.
First, note that there is a bijection between the full rankings in X(1,...,1) and the permutations in Sn, where
the tabloid
i1
i2
...
in−1
in
is mapped to the permutation σ with the property that σ(j) = ij . It follows that we may view each
profile p ∈ M (1,...,1) as an element of QSn, where we simply replace each full ranking with its associated
permutation. This means that if p ∈ Mλ, then we may view p ∈ M (1,...,1) as an element of QSn that is
constant on the left cosets of the subgroup of Sn that fixes the tabloid containing the tableau corresponding
to the identity of Sn. (We will use this fact in the proof of Theorem 1.)
How is viewing a profile as an element of QSn helpful? It means that our positional voting procedures are
more than just linear transformations, and more than just QSn-module homomorphisms—they are the results
of profiles acting on weighting vectors ! More specifically, if p ∈ QSn is a profile, and w ∈ Q
n ∼=M (1,n−1) is
a weighting vector, then
Tw(p) = pw.
For example, in the three-candidate and eleven-voter example introduced above, note that if e ∈ S3 is the
identity and we use the usual cycle notation for the other elements in S3, then
Tw(p) =

1 1 s 0 s 0s 0 1 1 0 s
0 s 0 s 1 1




3
2
0
2
0
4


= 3

1s
0

+ 2

10
s

+ 2

01
s

+ 4

0s
1


= (3e+ 2(23) + 2(123) + 4(13))

1s
0


= pw.
This realization—that if p ∈M (1,...,1), then Tw(p) = pw, i.e., “the acted upon has become the actor”—leads
us to our first theorem. Before we state the theorem, though, we need a few observations about weighting
vectors whose entries sum to zero.
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It is important to keep in mind the relatively simple structure of the space M (1,n−1) in which our weighting
vector w resides (together, of course, with all of our results vectors). In particular, since M (1,n−1) ∼=
S(n) ⊕ S(n−1,1), we may write w = 1w + ŵ, where 1w ∈ S
(n) is the projection of w onto the all-ones
vector 1, and ŵ ∈ S(n−1,1) is the projection of w into the orthogonal (n − 1)-dimensional subspace of
vectors whose entries sum to zero. For example, if n = 3 and w = [1, s, 0]t, then 1w = [
1+s
3 ,
1+s
3 ,
1+s
3 ]
t and
ŵ = [ 2−s3 ,
2s−1
3 ,
−1−s
3 ]
t.
Since
Tw(p) = pw = p(1w + ŵ) = p1w + pŵ
and p1w ∈ S
(n), all of the information that will determine the outcome of the election is contained in the
summand pŵ. After all, p1w is simply some multiple of the all-ones vector and will therefore not differentiate
between any of the candidates. Because of this, we will focus most of our attention on weighting vectors
w ∈M (1,n−1) = Qn such that w = ŵ, i.e., weighting vectors whose entries sum to zero.
For convenience, we say that a vector in Qn whose entries sum to zero is a sum-zero vector. We also say
that such a vector is nontrivial if it does not equal the zero vector (since the weighting vector w = 0 would
obviously lead to the trivial result that the candidates all tie with zero points). A consequence of using a
sum-zero weighting vector w is that the results vector r = Tw(p) will also be a sum-zero vector. Keep in
mind, however, that the winner is still the candidate that receives the most number of points.
Theorem 1. Let n ≥ 2, and let λ = (λ1, . . . , λm) be a partition of n. Suppose that w1, . . . ,wk form a
linearly independent set of weighting vectors in Qm such that w1, . . . ,wk are sum-zero vectors. If r1, . . . , rk
are any sum-zero results vectors in Qn, then there exist infinitely many profiles p ∈Mλ such that Twi(p) = ri
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Proof. We first consider the full ranking case where λ = (1, . . . , 1). In this case, wi = wi. The sum-zero
vectors in Qn ∼= M (1,n−1) form a simple QSn-submodule (that is isomorphic to S
(n−1,1)), which we will
denote by U . Since the weighting vectors are linearly independent, there exists a linear transformation
T : U → U such that T (wi) = ri for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
By a theorem of Burnside (see, for example, [3]), every linear transformation from a simple QSn-module to
itself can be realized as the action of some element in QSn. In other words, there is some a ∈ QSn such that
T (u) = au for all u ∈ U . Moreover, there exist infinitely many b ∈ QSn such that bu = 0 for all u ∈ U . If
we set p = a+ b, then the theorem follows since Twi(p) = pwi = awi + bwi = ri + 0.
For a general λ, note that if {w1, . . . ,wk} ⊂ Q
m is linearly independent, then so is {w1, . . . ,wk} ⊂ Q
n. We
proved above that there exist infinitely many p ∈ QSn such that pwi = ri. But, as we saw earlier, we may
replace p with p′, where p′ is constant on the equivalence classes that form the tabloids of shape λ. We may
therefore also view p′ as an element of Mλ, in which case Twi(p
′) = pwi = ri for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k. 
Theorem 1 is an extension of Saari’s Theorem 1 in [8] in two ways. First, Saari’s theorem is a statement
about ordinal rankings, i.e., the order in which the candidates finish in the election. Our theorem says
something about cardinal rankings, i.e., the actual number of points that each candidate receives. Second,
whereas Saari’s theorem focuses on the fully ranked situation, we address both the fully and partially ranked
situations simultaneously.
Both theorems essentially imply that as long as the weighting vectors w1, . . . ,wk are different enough, it
could very well be the case that there is no relationship whatsoever between Tw1(p), . . . , Twk(p). Moreover,
as Saari describes in [14] and [15], this is just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to answering the question,
“How bad can it get?” Note, however, that our proof is decidedly algebraic in nature. Whereas Saari’s proof
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of Theorem 1 in [8] uses facts about open mappings, our proof of Theorem 1 uses an important result by
Burnside concerning the endomorphism ring of simple modules.
5. Approval Voting
Theorem 1 may be used to address paradoxical situations that arise in voting procedures related to positional
voting. For example, the approval voting procedure asks a voter to return an (unordered) list of the candidates
of whom she approves. A candidate receives a point for each time she appears on such a list, and the candidate
receiving the most points is declared the winner. (For more on approval voting, see [2].)
We naturally assume that, if a voter were to return a fully ranked list of the candidates, then the candidates
she would approve of would make up the top portion of her list. We may therefore imagine a situation
in which each voter is asked to return a fully ranked list of the candidates together with a cutoff point.
Candidates above the cutoff are those whom our voter approves of, and those below the cutoff are not.
We will denote the cutoff point in a tableau with a blank space separating the “approved” candidates from
the other candidates. For example, if n = 3, then the top row of Figure 3 contains those tableaux with cutoffs
that would be used by voters who only approve of their top candidate, whereas the second row contains those
tableaux with cutoffs that would be used by those voters who approve of their top two candidates.
1
2
3
1
3
2
2
1
3
2
3
1
3
1
2
3
2
1
1
2
3
1
3
2
2
1
3
2
3
1
3
1
2
3
2
1
Figure 3. Tableaux with cutoffs for approval voting.
Although it is perfectly fine for a voter to approve of all or none of the candidates in approval voting, such a
preference will have absolutely no impact on the outcome of the election. For convenience, we will therefore
assume that our voters approve of at least one, but not all, of the candidates. In this setting, our ranked
approval profile looks like
p =


p1
p2
...
pn−1


where pi corresponds to those voters who have approved of exactly i candidates.
Approval voting is related to positional voting in that we may view it as being made up of several positional
voting systems occurring simultaneously. To explain, consider the weighting vector
ai = (1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
i
, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−i
)
and note that the sum-zero portion of the results of the election using approval voting is given by
p1â1 + p2â2 + · · ·+ pn−1ân−1 = rapp.
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On the other hand, for a positional vote with respect to the weighting vector w, the sum-zero portion of the
result is given by
(p1 + p2 + · · ·+ pn−1)ŵ = rpos.
In the spirit of extending the ideas found in Theorem 1 to other settings such as approval voting, the following
theorem shows that rapp and rpos need not have anything in common.
Theorem 2. Let n ≥ 3, let rapp and rpos be any two sum-zero results vectors in Q
n, and let w be any
nontrivial sum-zero weighting vector in Qn. Then there exist infinitely many ranked approval profiles
p =


p1
p2
...
pn−1


such that the approval voting outcome of p is rapp, and the positional voting outcome with respect to w is
rpos.
Proof. It must be the case that w and â1 are linearly independent, or w and â2 are linearly independent.
Suppose, without loss of generality, that w and â2 are linearly independent. Set p1 and p2 such that
p1â1 = rapp, p2â2 = 0, and p2w = rpos − p1w, which we know can be done by Theorem 1. Then set
p3 = · · · = pn−1 = 0. The resulting ranked approval profile p has the desired property. Furthermore, by
Theorem 1, there are an infinite number of such ranked approval profiles. 
6. Equivalent Weighting Vectors and Effective Spaces
At this point, it is helpful to put an equivalence relation on weighting vectors. The idea is that two weight-
ing vectors should be equivalent if and only if they yield the same ordinal rankings for all profiles. For
convenience, we focus our attention on the fully ranked situation throughout this section.
Let the all-ones vector in Qn be denoted by 1. We say that two weighting vectors w and x in Qn are
equivalent, and write w ∼ x, if and only if there exist α, β ∈ Q such that α > 0 and x = αw + β1. This
equivalence relation is often used in the literature to simplify calculations and to pinpoint non-cosmetic
differences between different positional voting procedures.
To motivate this equivalence relation, note that, for any positive rational number α ∈ Q, it makes sense
to say that w is equivalent to αw since, for every p ∈ M (1,...,1), the ordinal ranking given by Tw(p) is
the exactly the same as that of Tαw(p). After all, the entries in Tαw(p) are simply the entries of Tw(p)
multiplied by α > 0.
Furthermore, suppose α, β ∈ Q where α > 0. If x = αw + β1, then the ordinal ranking given by Tx(p) is
exactly the same as that given by Tw(p). This is because the addition of β1 to αw changes each candidate’s
score by exactly the same amount.
Note that w ∼ x if and only if there is a positive rational number γ ∈ Q such that ŵ = γx̂, i.e., the sum-zero
component of w is a positive multiple of the sum-zero component of x. This is helpful to see because, by
Theorem 1, it means that two weighting vectors w and x will always yield the same outcome if and only if
w ∼ x. We therefore have the following theorem:
Theorem 3. (Theorem 2.3.1 in [10]) Let n ≥ 2, and let w and x be weighting vectors in Qn. The ordinal
rankings of Tw(p) and Tx(p) will be the same for all p ∈M
(1,...,1) if and only if w ∼ x.
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It is helpful to view Theorem 3 in terms of effective spaces, which is an approach used extensively and with
great success by Saari (see, for example, [12], [13], [14], and [16]). Recall that the effective space E(T ) of a
linear transformation T is the orthogonal complement ker(T )⊥ of the kernel of T . For convenience, if w is
a weighting vector, then we will denote the effective space of Tw by E(w) (rather than E(Tw)).
As a QSn-submodule of the profile space QSn, the effective space E(w) of any nontrivial sum-zero weighting
vector w is isomorphic to S(n−1,1). If w ∈ Qn has a nontrivial projection onto the all-ones vector and ŵ 6= 0,
then E(w) ∼= S(n) ⊕ S(n−1,1). On the other hand, if w is simply a nonzero multiple of the all-ones vector
(so ŵ = 0), then E(w) ∼= S(n) (and we only get ties).
Theorem 4. Let w and x be nontrivial sum-zero weighting vectors in Qn. Then E(w) = E(x) if and only
if w ∼ x or w ∼ −x. Furthermore, if E(w) 6= E(x), then E(w) ∩ E(x) = {0}.
Proof. Suppose E(w) = E(x). This implies that ker(Tw) = ker(Tx) = ker(T−x). By Theorem 1, if w ≁ x
and w ≁ −x, then there exists a profile p such that pw 6= 0 and px = p(−x) = 0. Thus, if E(w) = E(x),
then w ∼ x or w ∼ −x.
On the other hand, if w ∼ x or w ∼ −x, then w and x are linearly dependent (since we are assuming that
w = ŵ and x = x̂). Thus, ker(Tw) = ker(Tx), implying that E(w) = E(x).
Finally, E(w) ∩ E(x) is a submodule of both E(w) and E(x), and E(w) and E(x) are simple submodules
(that are isomorphic to S(n−1,1)). Thus, if E(w) 6= E(x), then it follows that E(w) ∩ E(x) = {0}. 
By Theorem 4, distinct effective spaces for sum-zero weighting vectors intersect only at 0. We can, however,
say more. To explain, we write w ⊥ x if the dot product of w and x is zero, i.e., if they are orthogonal.
Furthermore, if U and W are subspaces of a vector space such that every vector in U is orthogonal to every
vector in W , then we write U ⊥W .
Recall that we may view permutations σ ∈ Sn as tableaux in M
(1,...,1). For example, the permutation
σ = (124)(35) corresponds to the tableau
2
4
5
1
3
inM (1,1,1,1,1). In particular, note that the position that candidate j occupies with respect to the permutation
σ is given by σ−1(j), in which case, for a weighting vector w = [w1, . . . , wn]
t, candidate j would receive
wσ−1(j) points.
Theorem 5. If w and x are nontrivial sum-zero weighting vectors in Qn, then E(w) ⊥ E(x) if and only if
w ⊥ x.
Proof. First, note that E(w) is simply the row space of Tw when we view Tw as a matrix with respect to the
indicator functions of M (1,...,1). It follows that if E(w) ⊥ E(x), then each row of Tw is orthogonal to each
row of Tx. The dot product of the first row of Tw and the first row of Tx, however, is a non-zero multiple of
the dot product of w and x, as we show below in (1). It follows that, if E(w) ⊥ E(x), then w ⊥ x.
12
On the other hand, suppose w ⊥ x. Partition the permutations of the candidates into n sets X1, . . . , Xn
where Xi contains the permutations that have the first candidate, c1, in the ith position. Within each Xi,
every candidate other than c1 occupies every position other than the ith position the same number of times,
namely (n − 2)! times. This is because the ith position is taken by c1, and by fixing cj, j 6= 1, in some
position, we are free to place the other candidates in (n− 2)! ways.
The rows of Tw correspond to functions defined on the permutations of the n candidates. The value that the
jth row assigns to the permutation σ is wσ−1(j), which is, of course, the weight given to candidate j based
on the permutation σ.
Let r1(w) be the first row of Tw, and let rj(x) be the jth row of Tx. These rows may be viewed as elements
of QSn, where (r1(w))(σ) = wσ−1(1) and (rj(x))(σ) = xσ−1(j). Taking dot products yields
r1(w) · rj(x) =
∑
σ
wσ−1(1)xσ−1(j)
=
n∑
i=1
∑
σ∈Xi
wσ−1(1)xσ−1(j)
=
n∑
i=1
wi
∑
σ∈Xi
xσ−1(j).
If j = 1, then ∑
σ∈Xi
xσ−1(j) =
∑
σ∈Xi
xσ−1(1) = (n− 1)!xi.
It follows that
r1(w) · r1(x) =
n∑
i=1
wi((n− 1)!xi)(1)
= (n− 1)!
n∑
i=1
wixi
= (n− 1)!(w · x)
= 0
since w ⊥ x.
On the other hand, if j 6= 1, then∑
σ∈Xi
xσ−1(j) = (n− 2)!
∑
k 6=i
xk = (n− 2)!(−xi).
which implies that
r1(w) · rj(x) =
n∑
i=1
wi((n− 2)!(−xi))
= −(n− 2)!
n∑
i=1
wixi
= −(n− 2)!(w · x)
= 0.
Thus, if w ⊥ x, then we have that r1(w) ⊥ rj(x) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n. To complete the proof, note that the ith
row of Tw is the result of acting on r1(w) with the transposition ξ = (1 i) that swaps 1 and i. It follows that
ri(w) · rj(x) = (ξri(w)) · (ξrj(x)) = r1(w) · rξ(j)(x) = 0.
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Thus, the row space of Tw is orthogonal to the row space of Tx. In other words, E(w) ⊥ E(x). 
7. The Borda Count
If you are familiar at all with Saari’s work, then you know that the Borda count, i.e., the positional voting
procedure for n candidates that uses the weighting vector w = [n− 1, n− 2, . . . , 2, 1, 0]t, plays a special role
when it comes to positional voting. In this section, we use the algebraic framework we have thus far created
to show why this is the case. In doing so, we also begin to pave the way toward an analogue to the Borda
count for partially ranked voting data.
To motivate our discussion, consider the so-called Copeland Method for running an election. This procedure
is based on information concerning head-to-head contests between the candidates. For each candidate ci, let
w(i) and l(i) be the number of head-to-head contests won and lost, respectively, by ci. The winner under
Copeland’s Method is the candidate whose difference w(i) − l(i) is largest.
In our running example of an election with three candidates and eleven voters, candidate c3 defeats both c1
and c2 in head to head contests, and c2 defeats c1. The scores for candidates c1, c2, and c3 are therefore
0− 2 = −2, 1− 1 = 0, and 2− 0 = 2, respectively. Thus, c3 is the winner using the Copeland Method. Note,
by the way, that c3 beat all of the other candidates in head-to-head contests. When such a candidate exists,
she is said to be a Condorcet winner.
What makes the Copeland Method interesting for us is that all of the results can be derived from the image
of a map P : M (1,...,1) → M (1,1,n−2) which we call the pairs map. The idea behind the pairs map is that it
extracts all of the necessary information concerning pairs of candidates (think head-to-head contests). The
defining characteristic of P is that it maps a basis vector u in M (1,...,1) to the sum of all basis vectors in
M (1,1,n−2) whose associated ordered pairs are ranked in the same order as they are ranked in u.
For example, suppose n = 4. Then the image of the basis vector corresponding to
3
1
4
2
is
3
1
2 4
+
3
4
1 2
+
3
2
1 4
+
1
4
2 3
+
1
2
3 4
+
4
2
1 3
.
Given the profile p ∈ M (1,...,1), the scores for Copeland’s Method can all be determined from the image
of p under the pairs map. You need only consult the coefficients of P (p) to determine the winner of each
head-to-head contest. Moreover, there are several examples of voting procedures that essentially rely solely
on pairs data (see, for example, a list of such procedures in Chapter 4 of [1]).
An interesting question now arises. What relationship, if any, is there between a map Tw and the pairs map
P? To make this question more concrete, let T : V → W and T ′ : V → U be two linear transformations
defined on the same vector space V . We say that T ′ is recoverable from T if there exists a linear transformation
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R : W → U such that T ′ = R ◦ T . It is easy to show that T ′ is recoverable from T if and only if
ker(T ) ⊆ ker(T ′) which, in turn, occurs if and only if E(T ′) ⊆ E(T ).
This leads us to a much more specific form of the question above. For what weighting vectors w ∈ Qn
is Tw recoverable from P? To answer this question, we will focus on the effective spaces of our positional
voting procedures and pairs map. Once again, the representation theory of the symmetric group will play
an important role.
The first thing we want to do is to note that the pairs map P : M (1,...,1) → M (1,1,n−2) is a QSn-module
homomorphism. Thus, we may make use of Schur’s Lemma. Next, we turn our attention to the effective
space of P . The codomain M (1,1,n−2) of the pairs map P has the following decomposition into simple
submodules:
M (1,1,n−2) ∼= S(n) ⊕ S(n−1,1) ⊕ S(n−1,1) ⊕ S(n−2,2) ⊕ S(n−2,1,1).
Furthermore, it can be shown (using, for example, a dimension argument) that the image, and therefore the
effective space, of P is isomorphic to S(n) ⊕ S(n−1,1) ⊕ S(n−2,1,1). Since there is only one copy of S(n−1,1)
in this decomposition, it follows by Theorem 4 that there are at most two nontrivial equivalence classes of
weighting vectors whose effective spaces are contained in the effective space of P . As the following theorem
(which is essentially implied by Theorem 3.2.1 in [10]) shows, there are such equivalence classes. They are
the equivalence classes that contain the Borda count and its negative.
Theorem 6. Let n ≥ 2, and let w ∈ Qn be a nontrivial weighting vector (i.e., w ≁ 1). The map Tw is
recoverable from the pairs map P if and only if w or −w is equivalent to the Borda count.
Proof. By the above discussion, it is enough to show that if w is the Borda count weighting vector, i.e.,
w = [n− 1, n− 2, . . . , 2, 1, 0]t ∈ Qn, then Tw is recoverable from the P . This, however, is trivial. In fact, the
results vector one obtains by using the Borda count can be (and often is) viewed as the sum of the points
awarded to a candidate from all of her head-to-head victories, and these points are encoded (blatantly) in
the image of the pairs map P . 
One of the nice properties that the Borda count enjoys is that, if there is a Condorcet winner, she is never
ranked last by the Borda count (see, for example, Corollary 5 in [12]). By Theorem 1, any weighting vector
that is not equivalent to w = [n − 1, n − 2, . . . , 2, 1, 0]t does not enjoy this property. In fact, in the class
of positional voting procedures for fully ranked profiles, the Borda count maximizes the probability that a
Condorcet winner is actually ranked first [20]. For more on the relationship between the Borda count and
Copeland’s method, see [7] and [17].
The Borda count also has what is called reversal symmetry. In other words, under the Borda count, if all
of the voters were to completely reverse their ballots so that their first choice is now their last, their second
choice is now second to last, and so on, then the resulting ordinal ranking would be the complete reversal
of the original result. When n = 3, the Borda count is the unique weighting vector (up to equivalence) with
this property, but when n ≥ 4, there are others. For example, w = [6, 5, 1, 0]t has this property. This is easy
to see, however, once you recognize that [6, 5, 1, 0]t ∼ [3, 2,−2,−3]t.
8. Analogues to the Borda Count
Recall that if voters are returning fully ranked ballots, then the Borda count and its negative are the unique
(up to equivalence) nontrivial positional voting procedures that are recoverable from the pairs map. What
if, however, the voters do not return fully ranked ballots? What if it has been decided that it is infeasible to
ask voters to rank all of the candidates?
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In this section, we turn our attention to the “rank-only-your-top-k” situation in which λ = (1, . . . , 1, n−k) =
(1k, n− k). By generalizing only slightly the pairs map P :M (1,...,1) →M (1,1,n−2), we are able to generalize
Theorem 6 to the “rank-only-your-top-k” situation. Interestingly, and in contrast to the fully ranked case,
we show that there is more than one “Borda-like” equivalence class of weighting vectors.
We generalize the pairs map as follows. Let 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1, and define P kτ :M
(1k,n−k) →M (1,1,n−2) as we did for
the pairs map P in the full ranking case, except now, if two candidates ci and cj are tied for last place, then
we assign both of the ordered pairs (ci, cj) and (cj , ci) the value τ (think “points for tying”). By letting τ
be a parameter, we are able to consider simultaneously an infinite number of analogues of the pairs map P .
For example, suppose n = 4 and λ = (1, 1, 2). Then the image of the basis vector corresponding to
2
4
1 3
is
2
4
1 3
+
2
1
3 4
+
2
3
1 4
+
4
1
2 3
+
4
3
1 2
+ τ
1
3
2 4
+ τ
3
1
2 4
.
We now have the following question. For which partial weighting vectors w = [w1, . . . , wk+1]
t is Tw re-
coverable from P kτ ? To answer this question, define b = [b1, . . . , bk+1]
t to be the partial weighting vector
corresponding to λ = (1k, n− k) where bi = n− i for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and
bk+1 =
1
2
(n− k − 1).
This is the partial weighting vector one would get by “averaging the Borda count with respect to λ.” In
other words, we essentially use the Borda count for the top k candidates, but we assign the average of the
last n− k Borda count points to each of the last n− k candidates. This average is
1
n− k
(0 + 1 + 2 + · · ·+ (n− k − 1)) =
(n− k − 1)(n− k)
2(n− k)
=
1
2
(n− k − 1) = bk+1.
Similarly, we define bτ = [bτ1 , . . . , b
τ
k+1]
t in exactly the same way, except that we set
bτk+1 = τ(n− k − 1).
In other words, bτi = bi for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, but b
τ
k+1 = 2τbk+1. Thus, if τ = 1/2, then b = b
τ .
Our first goal is to show that both Tb and Tbτ are recoverable from P
k
τ . That is, we want to show that there
exist linear transformations ϕb and ψbτ such that Tb = ϕb ◦ P
k
τ and Tbτ = ψbτ ◦ P
k
τ . With that in mind,
define
ψbτ :M
(1,1,n−2) →M (1,n−1)
by setting
[ψbτ (v)]i =
∑
j 6=i
vij .
In other words, the result corresponding to the ith candidate is determined by summing all of the entries
corresponding to the ordered pairs (i, j) where j 6= i, i.e., all of the pairs in which candidate ci is beating
some other candidate.
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The map ψbτ is easily seen to be a QSn-module homomorphism. If we let ue be the indicator function
corresponding to the tabloid that contains the identiy permutation e ∈ Sn, then we may easily check that
[(ψbτ ◦ P
k
τ )(ue)]i = b
τ
i .
Together with the fact that ψbτ and P
k
τ are QSn-module homomorphisms, this implies that Tbτ = ψbτ ◦P
k
τ .
Thus, Tbτ is recoverable from P
k
τ .
Similarly, we may construct a linear transformation ϕb such that Tb = ϕb ◦ P
k
τ . First, note that for any
indicator function u, if we sum the entries of P kτ (u), we always get the same value E where
E = (n− 1) + (n− 2) + · · ·+ (n− k) + 2t
(
n− k
2
)
.
With that in mind, we define the QSn-module homomorphism
ϕb :M
(1,1,n−2) →M (1,n−1)
by setting
[ϕb(v)]i =
1
2

∑
j 6=i
(vij − vji) +
n− 1
E
∑
k,l
vkl

 .
Again, we may check (perhaps with a bit more work this time) that
[(ϕb ◦ P
k
τ )(ue)]i = bi.
Thus, Tb = ϕb ◦ P
k
τ , implying that Tb is also recoverable from P
k
τ .
Our next goal is to show that b and bτ are equivalent if and only if τ = 1/2. This is straightforward. If they
were equivalent, then the ratios of the differences between successive entries would have to be the same. In
particular, it would be the case that
bk−1 − bk
bk − bk+1
=
bτk−1 − b
τ
k
bτk − b
τ
k+1
.
This, however, is true if and only if τ = 1/2, since the above equation reduces to
1
(n− k)− 12 (n− k − 1)
=
1
(n− k)− τ(n− k − 1)
and solving for τ shows that τ = 1/2. We therefore have the following proposition:
Proposition 7. The weighting vectors b and bτ are equivalent if and only if τ = 1/2 (in which case b = bτ ).
Finally, we turn our attention to characterizing those weighting vectors that are recoverable from P kτ . We
begin with a proposition.
Proposition 8. If τ = 1/2, then the image of P kτ : M
(1k,n−k) → M (1,1,n−2) contains exactly one copy of
the simple module S(n−1,1).
Proof. Let I be the image of P kτ . Since I is a submodule of M
(1,1,n−2), and the simple module S(n−1,1)
appears exactly twice in any decomposition ofM (1,1,n−2) into simple modules, we know that any decomposi-
tion of I into simple modules can contain at most two copies of S(n−1,1). Furthermore, since b is a nontrivial
weighting vector and Tb = ϕb ◦ P
k
τ , we know that I must contain at least one copy of S
(n−1,1).
Let J be the direct sum of the two simple modules that are isomorphic to S(n−1,1) in a decomposition of
M (1,1,n−2) into simple modules. In other words, J is the so-called isotypic subspace of M (1,1,n−2) corre-
sponding to S(n−1,1). It turns out that any simple submodule of M (1,1,n−2) that is isomorphic to S(n−1,1) is
necessarily a submodule of J . We will make use of this fact shortly.
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Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that I contains two copies of S(n−1,1) when we decompose it into
simple modules. In other words, assume that J ⊆ I. Since τ = 1/2, we have that Tb = Tbτ . This implies
that ϕb ◦ P
k
τ = ψbτ ◦ P
k
τ , and therefore that
(ϕb − ψbτ ) ◦ P
k
τ
is the zero linear transformation. It follows that any vector in I must be in ker(ϕb − ψbτ ). In other words,
I ⊆ ker(ϕb − ψbτ ).
Our assumption is that J ⊆ I. Given the above, we may contradict this assumption by finding a vector in
J that is not in ker(ϕb − ψbτ ). With this in mind, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let vi ∈ M
(1,1,n−2) be such that the
coefficient corresponding to an ordered pair that contains i is (n− 2)/2, and is −1 otherwise.
The sum of the entries of vi is zero. Furthermore, these vectors generate a submodule that is isomorphic to
S(n−1,1). Thus each vi is in the S
(n−1,1) isotypic space J of M (1,1,n−2), implying that each vi is in I. One
may easily verify, however, that vi ∈ kerϕb, but that vi /∈ kerψbτ . Since this is a contradiction, it must be
the case that I contains exactly one copy of S(n−1,1). 
The following theorem characterizes those weighting vectors that are recoverable from the map P kτ . More
specifically, it says that, with respect to P kτ , weighting vectors related to b and b
τ form the analogues of the
Borda count weighting vector [n− 1, n− 2, . . . , 1, 0]t when it comes to the “rank-only-your-top-k” situation.
Theorem 9. Let w be a partial weighting vector with respect to λ = (1k, n− k) where 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 2. The
positional map Tw is recoverable from the map P
k
τ if and only if ŵ is a linear combination of b̂ and b̂
τ .
Proof. If ŵ is a linear combination of b̂ and b̂τ , then Tw is clearly recoverable from P
k
τ . On the other
hand, suppose that Tw is recoverable from the pairwise map P
k
τ . If b 6= b
τ , then {b̂, b̂τ} is a basis for
the recoverable sum-zero weighting vectors since the image of P kτ contains at most two copies of the simple
module S(n−1,1). Thus ŵ is a linear combination of b̂ and b̂τ . If b = bτ , however, then by Proposition 8,
{b̂} is a basis for the recoverable sum-zero weighting vectors. In either case, the theorem follows. 
Recall that one of the nice properties of the Borda count is that, if there is a Condorcet winner, then she is
never ranked last by the Borda count. Condorcet winners make sense in the “rank-only-your-top-k” situation
as well since the pairs map P : M (1,...,1) → M (1,1,n−2) and P kτ : M
(1k,n−k) → M (1,1,n−2) have the same
codomain. It turns out that, if a profile p ∈ M (1
k,n−k) has a Condorcet winner with respect to P kτ , then it
has the same Condorcet winner with respect to all maps P kτ ′ where 0 ≤ τ
′ ≤ 1. In other words, the existence
of a Condorcet winner does not depend on τ .
As in the fully ranked case, it also turns out that if a Condorcet winner exists in the “rank-only-your-top-k”
situation, then she will never be ranked last under the positional map Tb. More importantly, given what we
have seen so far, it should hardly come as a surprise that this statement is not true for any other weighting
vector w such that b is not equivalent to w. Therefore, if the notion of a Condorcet winner is important to
you, then it would certainly be reasonable to say that b is the unique (up to equivalence) analogue of the
usual Borda count.
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